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ABSTRACT
Common statistical measures of bond risk premia are volatile and countercyclical. This paper uses
survey data on interest rate forecasts to construct subjective bond risk premia. Subjective premia
are less volatile and not very cyclical; instead they are high, only around the early 1980s. The reason
for the discrepancy is that survey forecasts of interest rates are made as if both the level and the
slope of the yield curve are more persistent than under common statistical models. The paper then
proposes a consumption based asset pricing model with learning to explain jointly the diﬀerence
between survey and statistical forecasts, and the evolution of subjective premia. Adaptive learning
gives rise to inertia in forecasts, as well as changes in conditional volatility that help understand
both features.
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the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.II n t r o d u c t i o n
Many studies have documented that excess returns on long term bonds are predictable.1 Indeed,
postwar interest rate data reveal two striking patterns. On the one hand, high excess returns on
long term bonds were typically preceded by a high spread between the long and short Treasury
interest rates (a high "slope" of the yield curve). On the other hand, higher excess returns were
typically preceded by a higher overall level of the yield curve. An investor who understood these
two patterns would have predicted high excess returns on long bonds in times of high slope (for
example, right after recessions) and in times of high level (especially in the early 1980s). Over the
postwar period, the investor could have made a fortune trading on these predictions (borrowing
short term and investing in long bonds in times of high slope or high level).
Why did investors not exploit these predictability patterns and thus make them disappear?
There are two candidate reasons. The ﬁrst is simply that investors’ actual historical predictions of
excess returns were diﬀerent from the in-sample predictions found in today’s statistical analysis.
Investors may not have recognized the same patterns that we see today with the beneﬁt of hindsight,
at least not to the same extent. The second candidate reason is that changes in investors’ assessment
of risk were correlated with their excess return predictions. Even if investors predicted high excess
returns on a strategy at some point in time, they may have chosen not to act on the prediction
because they had simultaneously perceived an increase in the risk of the strategy, or because they
had become more risk averse.
The standard approach in quantitative asset pricing studies is to focus almost exclusively on this
second reason for predictability patterns. These studies assume that investors’ historical predictions
were identical to in-sample predictions derived today from statistical models, thus ruling out the ﬁrst
reason. Instead, most research eﬀort has been directed at documenting and explaining changes in
risk assessment (e.g., Campbell and Cochrane 1995, Bansal and Yaron 2004, Wachter 2006, Hansen,
Heaton, Lee, and Roussanov 2007).
The goal of this paper is to document and explain the role of both candidate reasons for pre-
1As a concrete example, consider the excess return on a 10 year Treasury bond held over one year. It is deﬁned
as the return earned by holding the bond over the course of a year minus the one year interest rate available at the
beginning of the year.
1dictability — diﬀerences between actual historical and today’s statistical predictions on the one
hand, and changes in risk assessment on the other. The ﬁr s tp a r to ft h ep a p e ru s e ss u r v e yd a t a
on interest rate and inﬂation forecasts to document historical predictions of excess returns and to
compare those to predictions from statistical models. There are two main results. First, historical
predicted excess returns vary less than statistical predictions (by roughly one half). Second, his-
torical predicted excess returns move less with the business cycle, but have a larger low frequency
component that is correlated with inﬂation.
These ﬁndings imply that both candidate reasons for predictability patterns are important and
that structural models should account for both. Indeed, a consumption based asset pricing model
says that excess returns 





=0 , where +1 is marginal utility
and where the expectation is taken under the subjective belief of the investor. The expected excess























diﬀerence in predictions risk premium
The standard approach to explaining predictability patterns (that is, changes in b 
+1) assumes
that the ﬁrst component is zero and that changes in risk assessment move around risk premia. Our
ﬁndings call for a theory that can jointly account for both components.
To this end, the second part of the paper studies a representative agent asset pricing model with
learning and recursive utility. An adaptive learning algorithm gives rise to a sequence of subjective
beliefs about consumption growth, inﬂation and interest rates. We compute predictions made by
learning agents under their subjective belief, and thus obtain an explanation for the ﬁrst term in
(1). We check the relevance of this explanation by comparing the predictions made by learning
agents to actual survey forecasts. Learning not only changes the forecasting rules used to make
predictions, but also the risk perceived by investors. Our recursive utility model with subjective
beliefs thus implies time varying subjective risk premia, providing an explanation for the second
term in (1). We check the relevance of this explanation by examining the model’s Euler equation
errors.
2We ﬁn dt h a to u rm o d e lc a nh e l pu n d e r s t a n dt h em o v e m e n t si nb o t hc o m p o n e n t so fs t a t i s t i c a l
risk premia (1). On the one hand, adaptive learning provides a reason for systematic diﬀerences
between statistical forecasts and survey forecasts. Adaptive learners react slowly to new infor-
mation. They forecast relatively low interest rates as rates are rising, such as before 1980, and
relatively high interest rates when rates are falling, such as after 1980. Moreover, they do not
change their forecasts in response to sharp changes in rates, be they upward changes, as after the
oil price shocks, or downward changes, as in the recessions after 1980. Overall, adaptive learning
gives rise to a diﬀerence in predictions that is low before 1980, high after 1980 and countercyclical,
much like the diﬀerence in predictions from surveys in (1), and like the statistical expected excess
returns themselves.
On the other hand, adaptive learning gives rise to changes in perceived risk that in turn generate
low frequency movements in subjective risk premia on long bonds. With recursive utility, the risk
p r e m i u mo na na s s e ti sh i g hi ft h ea s s e tp a y o ﬀ either covaries a lot either with consumption growth
or with news about future consumption growth. Under adaptive learning, the covariance between
bond payoﬀs and consumption changes over time: after the experience of the 1970s, high interest
rates were viewed much more as a predictor of low growth than in later years. As a result, adaptive
learners viewed bonds as particularly unattractive around 1980, and demanded high subjective
premia.
We build on a small literature which has shown that measuring subjective beliefs via surveys can
help understand asset pricing puzzles. Froot (1989) argued that evidence against the expectations
hypothesis of the term structure might be due to the failure of the (auxiliary) rational expectations
assumption imposed in the tests rather than to failures of the expectations hypothesis itself. He
used the Goldsmith-Nagan survey to measure interest rate forecasts and found that the failure of the
expectations hypothesis for long bonds can be attributed to expectational errors. The ﬁndings from
our reduced form model conﬁrm Froot’s results while including the BlueChip data set that allows for
a longer sample as well as more forecast horizons and maturities. Moreover, our estimation jointly
uses all data and recovers and characterizes the kernel .2 Several authors have explored the role
2Kim and Orphanides (2007) estimate a reduced-form term structure model using data on both interest rates and
interest rate forecasts. They show that incorporating survey forecasts into the estimation sharpens the estimates of
risk premia in small samples. In our language, they obtain more precise estimates of “statistical premia”; they are
not interested in the properties of subjective risk premia for structural modelling. Chernov and Mueller (2008) adopt
3of expectational errors in foreign exchange markets. Frankel and Froot (1989) show that much
of the forward discount can be attributed to expectational errors. Gourinchas and Tornell (2004)
use survey data to show that deviations from rational expectations can rationalize the forward
premium and delayed overshooting puzzles. Bacchetta, Mertens and van Wincoop (2008) study
expectational errors across a large number of asset markets.
T h er e s to ft h ep a p e ri ss t r u c t u r e da sf o l l o w s .S e c t i o nI Id o c u m e n t sp r o p e r t i e so fs u r v e yf o r e -
casts. Subsection II.A takes a ﬁrst look at the raw survey data for selected maturities and forecasting
horizons. Subsection II.B compresses the information from the surveys using a time series model.
Section III introduces the modeling framework and reports results from the structural model.
II Stylized Facts
We consider “zero coupon” bonds that pay oﬀ only once at some speciﬁed maturity date. Let 
()

denote the date  price of a zero coupon bond with maturity ,t h a ti s ,t h eb o n dp a y so ﬀ one





It represents the per period interest rate earned from holding the bond to maturity if gains are
continuously compounded.
The log excess return from holding the  period bond from date  to date  +1is denoted

()
+1.I ti sd e ﬁned as the log capital gain on the -period bond less the one period interest rate:

()







Excess returns over longer holding periods are deﬁned analogously. We use lower case letters for
logarithms, e.g. 
()
 =l o g
()
 and so on. The log excess return on an -period bond held from 












 is the date  yield to maturity on an - p e r i o db o n d . Ah i g he x c e s sr e t u r no nal o n g
a similar approach for inﬂation forecasting.
4bond is earned if the capital gain exceeds the short term interest rate. This is more likely if the
rate 
(−)
 over the remaining life of the bond is relatively low.
Excess returns and forward rates
E x c e s sr e t u r n so nl o n gb o n d sc a na l s ob ew r i t t e ni nt e r m so ff o r w a r dr a t e s .Af o r w a r dc o n t r a c t
ﬁxes a price (or, equivalently, a yield to maturity) for purchase or sale of a speciﬁed bond at some
speciﬁed date in the future. Let 
(−)
 denote the price ﬁxed at date  for an −-period bond
to be purchased at date  + . In a frictionless market, locking in the purchase of an  − -period
bond for date + i st h es a m ea sb o r r o w i n g
()
 dollars at the -period rate at date  and using the
borrowed money to purchase one -period bond. In both cases, one ends up paying some amount
of money at date  +  in exchange for an ( − )-period bond. The absence of arbitrage thus
requires that the payments are the same under the two strategies, that is, the forward price to be










 = −log 
(−)
 ( − ) denote the yield to maturity on the forward contract,
or the “forward rate”. Condition (3) implies that the forward rate can be expressed as a linear



























If the maturity of the long bond  and a small maturity  of the forward contract, the forward rate
behaves essentially equal to the long bond rate. In contrast, if  is large but  is close to ,t h e
forward rate behaves like a scaled version of the spread between the two rates.
It now follows that the excess return (2) can be rewritten as the (scaled) diﬀerence between the
forward and the future spot rate:

()




5Excess returns are thus high if realized spot rates are lower than the associated forward rates.
Statistical and historical expected excess returns
This paper is about conditional expectations of excess returns. In particular, we want to
distinguish between expected excess returns implied by a statistical model and historical predictions
of excess returns. We write b 
()
+ to denote the date  prediction from a statistical model, for
example, a regression of log excess returns on variables known at date . T h i si st h eo b j e c tt h a t
the literature has been interested in: the stylized fact “predictability of excess returns on long
bonds” means that b 
()
+ moves around over time. Of course, the behavior of the conditional
expectation depends on the particular statistical model used to compute it, and we will discuss
several alternative models. In the literature, predictability has been established for a wide range
of models.
We reserve the notation 
()
+ for historical predictions, or “true” expectations, of excess
returns made at date . To relate the two types of predictions, we decompose the expected excess



































































statistical premium = subjective premium + subj. — stat. interest-rate expectation
Here the second line reﬂects the fact that the only uncertain part in the excess return is the
future bond price, and the third line follows from the deﬁnition of the yield to maturity. The
decomposition shows that statistical expected excess returns can move around either because actual
historical expected excess returns move around, or because statistical interest rate forecasts diﬀer
from historical interest rate forecasts.
In the next two subsections, we measure the two terms in the decomposition (4) with data on
actual interest rates as well as survey forecasts. In subsection II.A, we take the simplest possible
approach. We run regressions of excess returns on a set of date  interest rates to construct measures
6of b 
()
+ and b 
(−)
+ , and we use the median survey forecast of 
(−)
+ as a measure of 
(−)
+ .
This approach delivers a decomposition for a given bond maturity and a given forecast horizon,
and thus provides a ﬁrst look at the data. Unfortunately, the approach is limited by the nature
of survey forecast data, which provide long samples for only a few bond maturities and forecast
horizons. It also does not simultaneously process the information contained in the surveys for the
many maturities and horizons that are available.
To compress all the available information from surveys, subsection II.B estimates a statistical
model that describes the joint dynamics of actual interest rates and survey forecasts. The model
is a standard linear state space system — both interest rates and survey forecasts are represented
as linear functions of a small number of factors. We show that such a system does a decent job in
describing the joint dynamics of interest rates and forecasts. We then proceed to use the system to
show decompositions (4) for bonds and holding periods for which raw survey data are not available.
AA ﬁr s tl o o ka tt h ed a t a
We measure subjective expectations of interest rates with survey data from two sources. Both
sources conduct comparable surveys that ask approximately 40 ﬁnancial market professionals for
their interest-rate expectations at the end of each quarter and record the median survey response.
Our ﬁrst source are the Goldsmith-Nagan surveys that were started in mid-1969 and continued until
the end of 1986. These surveys ask participants about their one-quarter ahead and two-quarter
ahead expectations of various interest rates, including the 3-month Treasury bill, the 12-month
Treasury bill rate, and a mortgage rate. Our second source are Bluechip Financial Forecasts, a
survey that was started in 1983 and continues until today. This survey asks participants for a
wider range of expectation horizons (from one to six quarters ahead) and about a larger set of
interest rates. The most recent surveys always include 3-month, 6-month and 1-year Treasury bills,
the 2-year, 5-year, 10-year and 30-year Treasury bonds, and a mortgage rate.3
To measure interest-rate expectations from a statistical model, we estimate unrestricted VAR
3The survey questions ask for constant-maturity Treasury yield expectations. To construct zero-coupon yield
expectations implied by the surveys, we use the following approximation. We compute the expected change in the
-year constant-maturity yield. We then add the expected change to the current -year zero-coupon yield.
7dynamics for a vector of interest rates with quarterly data over the sample 1952:2-2007:4 and
compute their implied forecasts. Later, in section II.B, we will impose more structure on the VAR
by assuming the absence of arbitrage and using a lower number of variables in the VAR, and thereby
check the robustness of the empirical ﬁndings we document here. The vector of interest rates 
includes the 1-year, 2-year, 3-year, 4-year, 5-year, 10-year and 20-year zero-coupon yields. We use
data on nominal zero-coupon bond yields with longer maturities from McCulloch and Kwon (1993).
The sample for these data is 1952:2 - 1990:4. We augment these data with the new Gurkaynak,
Sack, and Wright (2006) data. We compute the forecasts by running OLS directly on the system
+ =  + + +, so that we can compute the -horizon forecast simply as  + 
We can evaluate equation (4) based on our survey measures of subjective interest-rate expec-
tations ˆ 
(−)
+ and the VAR measures of expectations ˆ 
(−)
+ for diﬀerent maturities  and
diﬀerent horizons . Figure 1 plots the left-hand side of equation (4), expected excess returns
under VAR beliefs as a black line, and the second term on the right-hand side of the equation,
the diﬀerence between subjective and VAR interest-rate expectations, as a gray line. For the short
post-1983 sample for which we have Bluechip data, we have data for many maturities  and many
forecasting horizons  The lower two panels of Figure 1 use maturities  = 3y e a r sa n d1 1y e a r s
and a horizon of  =1year, so that we deal with expectations of the  −  = 2 year and 10 year
interest rate. These combinations of  and  are in the Bluechip survey, and the VAR includes
these two maturities as well so that the computation of expectations is easy.
For the long post-1970 sample, we need to combine data from the Goldsmith-Nagan and
Bluechip surveys. The upper left panel shows the  =1 5 year bond and  = 6m o n t hh o l d -
ing period from the estimated VAR (which includes the − =1year yield.) This works because
both surveys include the − =1year interest rate and a  = 6-month horizon. The VAR delivers
a 6-month ahead expectation of the 1-year interest rate. For long bonds, we do not have consistent
survey data over this long sample. To get a rough idea of long-rate expectations during the Great
Inﬂation, we take the Goldsmith-Nagan data on expected mortgage-rate changes and the Bluechip
data on expected 30-year Treasury-yield over the next  = 2 quarters and add them to the current
20-year zero-coupon yield. The VAR produces a  = 2 quarter ahead forecast of the 20-year yield.
Figure 1 also shows NBER recessions as shaded areas. The plots indicate that expected excess































Long sample, n = 20.5 years, h = 6 months
























Short sample, n = 11 years, h = 1 year
Figure 1: Each panel shows expectations of excess returns derived from a VAR in black (the left-
hand side of equation (4)) and the diﬀerence between subjective and VAR interest-rate expectations
in gray (the second term on the right-hand side of the equation) for the indicated bond maturity
 and holding period/forecast horizon  Shaded areas indicate NBER recessions. The numbers
are annualized and in percent. The upper panels show data over a longer sample than the lower
panels.
returns computed from the VAR and the diﬀerence between subjective and VAR interest-rate
expectations have common business-cycle movements. The patterns appear more clearly in the
lower panels which use longer (1 year) horizons. This is not surprising in light of the existing
predictability literature which documents that expected excess returns on bonds and other assets
are countercyclical when we look at longer holding periods, such as one year (e.g., Cochrane and
9Piazzesi 2005). In particular, expected excess returns are high right after recession troughs. The
lower panels show indeed high values for both series around and after the 1991 and 2001 recessions.
The series are also high in 1984 and 1996, which are years of slower growth (as indicated, for
example, by employment numbers) although they were not classiﬁed as recessions.
For shorter holding periods, the patterns are also there in the data but they are much weaker.
However, the upper panels show additional recessions where similar patterns appear. For example,
the two series in both panels are high in the 1970, 1974, 1980 and 1982 recessions or shortly
afterwards. (As we can see in the upper panels, expected excess returns for short holding periods
are large when annualized. Of course, the risk involved in these investment strategies is high, and
so they are not necessarily attractive.)
Table 1: Forecast Errors Regressions from Surveys
maturity
1y e a r 2y e a r 3y e a r 5y e a r 7y e a r 1 0y e a r 3 0y e a r
YS 0.22 0.53 0.89 1.72 2.70 4.08 12.98
t-stat 0.60 0.84 1.05 1.46 1.85 2.09 2.18
2 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.14
CP 2 0.14 0.10 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.13 0.19









 variables over the Bluechip sample. The forecast 
(−)
+ is measured as median
forecast in the Bluechip survey. The "YS” row reports the slope coeﬃcient from a
regression on a constant and the spread between the 5-year yield and the 3-month short
rate, and its t-statistic computed with Hansen-Hodrick standard errors with 4 quarterly
lags. The "CP 2"u s e sﬁve forward rates as right-hand side variables.
The above ﬁndings depend on a particular choice of a statistical model, or VAR. We can see the





instead of forecast diﬀerences relative to the VAR. Table 1 reports results from regressions of these
realized survey forecast errors, scaled by ( − ) as on the right-hand side of equation (4), on
time  variables. The row labeled "YS" reports the slope coeﬃcients of a regression on the time
 yield spread between the 5-year bond and the 1-quarter bond. The point estimates in these




+ are countercyclical and thus
10systematic over the business cycle. In particular, survey interest rate forecasts tend to be above
the subsequent realized values in periods of high spreads, and thus recessions. The slope coeﬃcient
estimates increase with the maturity of the bond whose interest rate we are forecasting and are
signiﬁcant for long bonds (10 and 30 years.) The 2 in these regressions range from 2% to 14%.
We also report the 2 from a regression on ﬁve forward rates, as in Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005),
indicated "CP 2." Naturally, these 2 are higher, and range from 8% - 19%.
A potential concern with Bluechip forecast data is that the survey is not anonymous, and
so career concerns of survey respondents may matter. To address this concern, we also measure
subjective interest-rate expectations using the Survey of Professional Forecasters. Starting in 1992,
the SPF reports median interest-rate forecasts for the 10-year Treasury bond over various forecast
horizons. We ﬁnd that median forecasts from the SPF are similar to those from the Bluechip survey.
Importantly, the diﬀerences between SPF forecasts and VAR expectations show the same patterns
as those documented in Figure 1.
To sum up, the evidence presented in this section suggests that subjective interest-rate expec-
tations deviate from the expectations that we commonly measure from statistical models. Figure
1 suggests that these deviations may also be responsible for the time-variation in statistical bond
premia.
B Joint dynamics of interest rates and survey forecasts
We describe the dynamics of interest rates, macro variables, and median survey forecasts by a state
space system with a small number of factors. This approach is known to work well, because interest
rates of diﬀerent maturities are highly correlated. For example, in a typical cross section of interest
rates, the ﬁrst principal component typically explains more than 90% of the variation. We assume
that there is a vector of four factors that can be represented by a vector AR(1) process with mean
zero:
(5)  = −1 + 
where  is a sequence of iid normal shocks with variance Ω.




 =  + >

Under our model, interest rates of all maturities are thus deterministic functions of the same small
number of factors. If the coeﬃcients  and  were unrestricted in the estimation, the resulting
model would generally imply that there are opportunities for riskless arbitrage in the bond market.
Since riskless arbitrage opportunities would be quickly eliminated by bond market participants,
it makes sense to rule them out from the beginning. We thus restrict the coeﬃcients ( ) which
also makes the model more parsimonious. In particular, we assume that there exist a 4 × 1 vector



























Standard arguments (explained in detail in the appendix) imply that these restrictions rule out
riskless arbitrage.
In addition to interest rates, we also want to describe the dynamics of macro variables such as
inﬂation and consumption growth. We collect these variables in a vector  and assume that they
are linear functions of the factor plus noise:
(8)  =  + −1 + 
The complete model of actual yields and macro variables model is thus summarized by (5)-(8).
It is parametrized by the factor dynamics parameters (), the yield coeﬃcient parameters
¡
1 1  
¢
, the macro variable parameters ( ) and the variance of the shocks Ω
In this subsection, the statistical forecasts b  of interest rates and macro variables are computed
directly from the estimated state space system. The -period ahead forecasts on the macro variables
12and the -period interest rate at date  are given by




+ =  + >
 ()
  (9)
We assume that survey forecasts follow the same functional form as the statistical forecasts
(9). We also assume that they are correct on average and that they respect the deterministic
arbitrage-free relationship (6) between factors and interest rates. However, survey forecasts may
diﬀer from statistical forecasts in the sensitivity to the diﬀerent factors. Our model of the -period
ahead survey forecasts on the macro variables and the -period interest rate at date  is thus














The estimation proceeds in three steps. We ﬁrst estimate the joint distribution of the factors
(equations (5)), the macro variables (equation (8)) and two interest rates. In a second step, we
use data on many other interest rates to estimate their coeﬃcients in (6). Finally, we use data on
survey forecasts for many forecast horizons and maturities to estimate the parameters in (9).
Data
The data consists of quarterly observations over the sample 1952:2—2007:3. The data on zero-
coupon interest rates and survey forecasts are the same as in section A. Moreover, we measure per
capita consumption growth ∆ and its corresponding inﬂation series  from data on nondurables
and services in the NIPA tables. (To construct appropriate quantity and price indices, we use the
corresponding lines in NIPA tables 2.3.3, 2.3.4 and 2.3.5.) The population series is also from NIPA
(line 38 from table 2.1). We also use measures of subjective inﬂation expectations from the Survey
13of Professional Forecasters. This survey is conducted at a quarterly frequency during the years
1968:4-2007:3.
Step 1: Factor dynamics and macro variables
We consider the joint dynamics of inﬂation, consumption growth, and two interest rates, the
short (q-quarter) rate and the spread between the 5-year and 1-quarter interest rates. From equa-
tions (5)-(8), these variables can be represented by a four variable state space system with four
factors
 =  +  +  (10)
 = −1 + 






  ) is
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⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟
⎠

We impose three sets of restrictions on this system. First, we identify the ﬁrst two factors with
the demeaned short rate and the demeaned spread. Formally, we set 1 equal to the ﬁr s tu n i tv e c t o r ,
and we let >
20 =( 1 100). As a result, the ﬁrst two observation equations become simply copies





we identify the third and fourth factor with expected inﬂation and expected consumption growth.




 In contrast to the ﬁrst two factors, the
third and fourth factor are latent. Even after the restrictions, the system is more ﬂexible than a
ﬁrst order VAR in the four observables. This is because the presence of the latent factors allows
for MA(1) style dynamics in the macro variables (which are important for capturing the dynamics
of inﬂation).
We estimate the unconditional means  =( 1 20 − 1 ) from the sample means of the short
rate, the spread, inﬂation and consumption growth. In the table, we report these means in percent,
14so that 1 × 100 = 128 means a 5.12% average short rate in annualized terms. The remaining 34
parameters ( ) are estimated by maximum likelihood. The parameter estimates also deliver
a sequence of estimates ˆ  for the realizations of the state variables, starting from 0 =0 .O fc o u r s e ,
the ﬁrst two components of ˆ  are equal to the demeaned short rate and spread. However, the third
and fourth factors are latent, and thus their respective entries of ˆ  represent their conditional
expectations given the data.
Table 2: Estimated dynamics
Panel A: Maximum Likelihood Of State Space System
 × 100 chol(Ω)

(1)






 0.25 −0110 0.118 0 0
— (0007) (0015) ——
 0.86 0.030 0.0211 0.253 0
— (0002) (0003) (0022) —
∆ 0.51 −0047 0022 −0083 0.411




 0.894 0.035 —0.016 031 1000
(0029) (0002) (0001) (0004)

(20)
 −  0038 0.827 —0.069 −0213 0 100
(0004) (0049) (0006) (0040)
 −0016 −0079 0980 0.118 0079 −0286 −0137 0.252
(0019) (0008) (0036) (0008) (0004) (0015) (0012) (0021)
∆ 0023 0083 −0068 0.584 0.532 0101 0.047 0.283
(0028) (0026) (0009) (0031) (0014) (0019) (0004) (0012)
Note: This table contains the maximum likelihood estimates for the state space system
 =  +  + 
 = −1 + 













  expected inﬂation, and
expected consumption growth, starting from 0 =0 . Standard errors are in brackets.
The sample is quarterly, 1952:2-2007:3.
15Step 2: Yield coeﬃcients
The second step is to estimate the interest rate parameters  and  .H e r ew et a k ea sg i v e n





we can form samples of predicted zero coupon yields
(11) 
()
 =  + >
 ˆ 




and 1 via the recursion (7). We
estimate  and  by minimizing, for a set of maturities, the sum of squared ﬁtting errors, that
is, diﬀerences between actual yields and predicted yields computed from (11). We use yields of
maturities 1, 2, 5, 10, 15, 20 and 30 years. We also impose the constraint that the spread between
the 5-year and 1-quarter rate that serves as a factor be matched exactly.
Table 2: Estimated dynamics
Panel B: Yield Coefficients on Factors
0 from  = −Ω0 1 from  =  − Ω1

(1)
 −3384 −5623 9.23 −18841 81.22





 20.44 −9411 −7178 −7324 29541
(073) (329) (1152) (937) (3772)
 48.96 65.72 2.46 −5967 −2348
(1777) (117) (023) (844) (578)
∆ 146.99 115.03 −3410 −14315 −12183
(310) (512) (222) (3545) (456)
NOTE: We estimate  and  by minimizing the squared ﬁtting errors of the model.
We parametrize them as follows:  = −Ω0 and  =  − Ω1 Standard errors
are computed by GMM, taking into account the two-step nature of the estimation.




as follows:  = −Ω0 and  =  − Ω1





is equal to ( ) if 0 =0and 1 =0  Panel B of Table 2 reports the estimates of 0
and 1. The standard errors (in brackets) take into account the two-step nature of the estimation.
16This is done by GMM; we stack the moment conditions from the ﬁrst step MLE (which are the
scores of the likelihood function) and the moment conditions from the second step NLS estimation
(which are the ﬁrst-order conditions for the minimization.) More details are in the Appendix.
Step 3: Subjective state space system
The third step is to estimate the parameters ∗
 and ∗
 that determine how survey forecasts
d e p e n do nt h ef a c t o r s .H e r ew et a k ea sg i v e nt h ef a c t o re s t i m a t e sb  and the means of the macro




from step 2. For
every (∗
 ∗
), we can form samples of predicted survey forecasts of macro variables and interest
rates






+ =ˆ  +ˆ >
 (∗
)
 ˆ  (12)
We estimate ∗
 and ∗
 by minimizing a sum of squared ﬁtting errors, that is, diﬀerences between
median survey forecasts and predicted forecasts computed as in (12). The maturities and horizons
for the interest rate forecasts diﬀer by sample period. For 1970:1-1982:2, we use Goldsmith-Nagan
data and consider a horizon of 2 quarters and maturities 1 year and 20 years. For 1982:3-2007:3,
we Bluechip data and consider horizons of 2 and 4 quarters, and maturities of 1 quarter, as well as
1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 10 and 30 years. For inﬂation forecasts, we use a horizon of 4 quarters over the sample
1968:2-2007:3. The only variable for which we do not have survey data is per capita consumption
of nondurables and services. Here, we impose that the forecasts from the subjective state space
system are equal to the forecasts from the state-space system.
For the estimation, we parametrize the coeﬃcients using a 4 × 4 matrix  which satisﬁes
∗
 =  − Ω and ∗
 =  − Ω Panel C in Table 2 reports the estimated . Again,
this parametrization highlights that ∗
 =  and ∗
 =  if  =0  Panel C also reports GMM
standard errors that take into account the three-step nature of this estimation. (We plan on inves-
tigating the small sample properties of these standard errors, since they seem low.) The ﬁrst two
steps are the MLE of the state space and the NLS for the yield coeﬃc i e n t s .T h el a s t ,t h i r d ,s t e pi s
also a NLS estimation, and we can stack its ﬁrst-order conditions together with the others. Details
17are in the Appendix.
Table 2: Estimated dynamics
Panel C: Subjective State Space system
 from ∗
 =  − Ω, ∗
 =  − Ω

(1)
 −4693 24.99 −6531 −1951





 −4293 −8690 −12837 −432
(073) (001) (002) (0001)
 66.80 14.31 66.80 14.61
(002) (0005) (002) (0003)
∆ 152.24 −7411 65.01 21.69
(004) (002) (002) (0001)
NOTE: We estimate ∗
 and ∗
 by minimizing the squared diﬀerence between the
subjective forecasts and survey forecasts. The table reports the estimated  in ∗
 =
 − Ω and ∗
 =  − Ω Standard errors are computed by GMM, taking into
account the three-step nature of the estimation.
DR e s u l t s
The appendix reports our estimates for subjective beliefs and beliefs derived from the statistical
model. To understand the estimated statistical dynamics, we report covariance functions which
completely characterize the Gaussian state space system. Figure 2 plots covariance functions com-
puted from the state space system and the raw data. At 0 quarters, these represent variances and
contemporaneous covariances. The black lines from the system match the gray lines in the data
quite well. To interpret the units, consider the upper left panel. The quarterly variance of the
short rate is 0.51 in the data which amounts to
√
051 × 4=1 43 percent annualized volatility.















=  ×051 = 048 which implies that the ﬁrst-order autocorrelation is
0.94.
The statistical dynamics of the state variables are persistent. The largest eigenvalues of the
matrix  are complex with a modulus of 0.95, while the third eigenvalue is 0.70. In Figure 2, the
18Figure 2: Covariance functions for the observables computed from the estimated state space system
and from the raw data. Shaded areas indicate 2 × standard errors bounds around the covariance
function from the data computed with GMM. For example, the graph titled "
(1)
 , lagged 
(1)
 "s h o w s
the covariance of the current short rate with the short rate lagged  quarters, where  is measured
on the horizontal axis.
autocovariance functions of the short rate and inﬂation are ﬂatter than that of the spread, which
indicates that they are more persistent. The short rate and the spread are contemporaneously
negatively correlated and the spread is negatively correlated with the short rate lagged less than
year, and positively correlated with longer lags of the short rate. The short rate is negatively
correlated with the lagged spread, even at long lags.
19Table 3: Estimation of Statistical Model
Panel A: Loadings of expected excess returns on state variables
horizon  =1year
 short rate spread exp  exp ∆
maturity of the bond 2 year 1.31 2.46 −151 −173
10 year 7.55 24.5 −933 −102
Panel B: Fitting errors for bond yields (annualized)
maturity
1 qrt 1 year 5 year 10 year 15 year 20 year 30 year
mean absolute errors (in %) 0 0.30 0 0.24 0.36 0.42 0.45














 Since the conditional variance of excess returns is constant, we can


















= −( − )
³
− + >












on the current factors  for a holding period of  =1year and bond maturities of
 =2years, 10 years. Panel B reports mean absolute model ﬁtting errors for yields.
To understand the implications of the estimated parameters 0 and 1 we investigate how
expected excess returns depend on the state variables. This dependence can be derived from
the state space system together with the yield coeﬃcients. Table 2 reports the loadings of these
conditional expected values on the state variables. For a 1-quarter holding period, these loadings are
−>














recursions for the coeﬃcients  and  The coeﬃcients in Table 3 indicate that the expected excess
return on a 2-year bond is high in periods with high spreads. For example, a 1-percent increase in
the spread (and everything else constant) leads to a 2.46 percent increase in the statistical premium.
This dependence on the spread captures is most important driving force of statistical premia and
captures their countercyclical nature. The premium on the 10-year bond has larger loadings on all
state variables. Roughly speaking, the coeﬃcient for the 10 year bond are roughly 10 times higher
than for the 2-year bond. Panel B of Table 3 reports by how much the model-implied yields diﬀer
from observed yields on average. By construction, the model hits the 1-quarter and 5-year interest
20rates exactly, because these rates are included as factors. For intermediate maturities, the error
lies within the 24 — 45 basis points range. We will see below that these errors are suﬃciently small
for our purposes.
Subjective vs. statistical dynamics
By construction, subjective forecasts are on average equal to the forecasts from our statistical
m o d e l .A tt h es a m et i m e ,t h ef a c t o r sa r em o r ep e r s i s t e n tu n d e rt h es u b j e c t i v es y s t e m .T h el a r g e s t
eigenvalues of the two matrices
b  =
⎛
⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜
⎝
089 004 016 031
004 083 −007 −021
−002 −008 098 011
002 008 −007 058
⎞




⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜
⎝
100 014 0001 −006
−004 088 −001 005
010 011 086 −006
001 009 −004 071
⎞
⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟
⎠

are 0.948 and 0.954, respectively. The next highest eigenvalues are 0.70 for the statistical system
and 0.86 for the subjective forecasts. Other things equal, a one-percent increase in the short rate
(spread) increases the subjective forecast of the short rate (spread) next period by 1% (88%), as
opposed to 89% (83%) under the statistical model.
The estimated subjective dynamics imply that subjective risk premia are less cyclical than
statistical premia. The subjective loadings on the spread in Table 4 are smaller than those in Table
3. For long bonds, the loading on the short rate increases under subjective beliefs, while the loading
on expected inﬂation is now also positive. This indicates that subjective premia on long bonds will
reﬂect some of the low-frequency movements in expected inﬂation and nominal interest rates.
Panel B of Table 4 reports mean absolute distances between the survey forecasts and model-
implied forecasts, for both the subjective belief and the statistical model. Comparison of these
errors provides a measure of how well the change of measure works to capture the deviation of
survey forecasts from statistical forecasts.
21Table 4: Estimation of Subjective Model
Panel A: Loadings of expected excess returns on state variables
horizon  =1year
 short rate spread exp  exp ∆
maturity 2 year 0.20 0.78 0.05 0.68
10 year 6.38 7.86 1.53 −382
P a n e lB :M e a na b s o l u t eﬁtting errors for yield forecasts (% p.a.)
maturity
subjective model statistical model
Bluechip sample, maturity of forecasted yield
horizon
1q r t 1y e a r 3y e a r 5y e a r 1 0y e a r 1q r t 1y e a r 3y e a r 5y e a r 1 0y e a r
2 quarter 0.28 0.39 0.26 0.25 0.35 0.42 0.60 0.39 0.28 0.34
1 year 0.33 0.36 0.25 0.24 0.33 0.62 0.75 0.60 0.51 0.54
Combined sample, maturity of forecasted yield
1 year 20 year 1 year 20 year
2 quarter 1.81 0.46 1.94 0.64
The results show that the improvement is small for short-horizon forecasts of short yields.
However, there is a marked reduction of errors for 1-year forecasts, especially for the 10-year bond.
Figure 3 shows where the improvements in matching the long-bond forecasts come from. The
top panel shows one-year ahead forecasts of the 10-year zero coupon rate constructed from survey
data in Section II.A, together with the corresponding forecasts from our subjective and statistical
models, for the sample 1982:4-2007:3. All forecasts track the actual 10-year rate over this period,
which is natural given the persistence of interest rates. The largest discrepancies between the
survey forecasts and the subjective model on the one hand, and the statistical model on the other
hand, occur during and after the recessions of 1990 and 2001. In both periods, the statistical model
quickly forecasts a drop in the interest rate, whereas investors did not actually expect such a drop.
The subjective model captures this property.
For our asset pricing application, we are particularly interested in how well the subjective model
captures deviations of survey forecasts of long interest rates from their statistical forecasts over the
business cycle. As discussed in Section II.A, this forecast diﬀerence is closely related to measured
expected excess returns. The bottom panel of the ﬁgure focuses again on forecasting a 10-year rate
o v e ro n ey e a r ,a n dp l o t st h ed i ﬀerence between the survey forecast and the statistical model forecast,





































Figure 3: The top panel shows one-year ahead forecasts of the 10-year zero coupon rate constructed
from survey data in Section II.A, together with the corresponding forecasts from our objective and
subjective models. The bottom panel shows the diﬀerence between the survey forecast and the
objective model forecast, as well as the diﬀerence between the subjective and objective model
forecasts.
as well as the diﬀerence between the subjective and statistical model forecasts. It is apparent that
both forecast diﬀerences move closely together at business cycle frequencies, increasing during and
after recessions. We thus conclude that the subjective model is useful to capture this key fact about
subjective forecasts that matters for asset pricing.
23E Subjective risk premia
We now compare our estimated subjective risk premia to common statistical measures of risk
premia. The motivation is that statistical measures of premia provide stylized facts that rational
expectations asset pricing models try to match. In particular, empirical evidence of predictability
of excess returns from standard predictability regressions has led to a search for sources of time
varying risk or risk aversion. The preliminary results of section II.A suggest that less time variation
in risk premia is required once investors’ forecast errors are taken into account. Here we quantify
how much time variation in expected excess returns is left once we move to subjective beliefs.
We focus on 1-year holding period returns on bonds with 2 and 10 years maturity. We compare
our subjective premia to three statistical measures of statistical premia. The ﬁrst is the ﬁtted value
of a regression of excess returns on a single yield spread, the 5-year-1-quarter spread, denoted the






 and a constant. This
regression is closely related to that in the classic Fama-Bliss study of bond return predictability,
which uses the forward-spot spread. The second measure (labelled CP measure) is the ﬁtted value
from a regression on ﬁve yields with maturities 1,2,3, 4 and 5 years. This follows Cochrane and
Piazzesi (2005) who showed that this approach leads to higher 2s. The third measure is, for each
subjective model speciﬁcation, the forecast from the corresponding statistical model which provides
the conditional expectation of the excess return.
Table 4 summarizes the properties of the regression based measures of statistical premia. Ac-
cording to these measures, the volatility of the predictable part of 1-year holding period returns
is below 1% per year for the 2-year bond, and around 5.3% for the 10-year bond. The regression
based on ﬁve yields naturally delivers a higher 2, 26% on both bonds. We are also interested in
the frequency properties of premia. We use a band pass ﬁlter to decompose premia into three or-
thogonal components, a low frequency “trend” component (period  8 years), a “cycle” component
(period between 1.5 and 8 years), as well as high frequency noise. The columns labelled “trend”
a n d“ c y c l e ”s h o wt h ep e r c e n t a g eo fv a r i a n c ec o n t r i b u t e db yt h er e s p e c t i v ec o m p o n e n t s .S i n c et h e
yield spread is a key business cycle indicator, the YS measure is particularly cyclical. The CP
measure improves in part by including a larger trend component.
24Table 4: Statistical Premia from Regressions
maturity 2 years maturity 10 years
Regression on yield spread (YS measure)
volatility % trend % cycle 2 volatility % trend % cycle 2
0.61 14 56 0.12 5.27 14 56 0.25
Regression on ﬁve yields (CP measure)
volatility % trend % cycle 2 volatility % trend % cycle 2
0.91 31 38 0.26 5.34 28 48 0.26
Table 5 presents a set of comparison statistics. The ﬁrst line shows the properties of the
subjective premium itself. For the baseline model, the standard deviation of the one-year premium
on a 2-year bond is 29 basis points; it is 3% on the 10-year bond. These volatilities are substantially
smaller than those of regression measures of premia. The frequency properties are also diﬀerent:
subjective premia tend to have larger trend components and smaller cyclical components than
regression based premia. This is particularly pronounced for the longer 10 year bond: in regression
models at least one half of the time variation in premia is cyclical, whereas for subjective premia
the share of cyclical variation is only 15%.
T a b l e5 :S u b j e c t i v eR i s kP r e m i a
maturity 2 years maturity 10 years
Baseline Model
volatility % trend % cycle volatility % trend % cycle
0.29 45 28 2.96 81 15
volatilities relative to measures of statistical premia
total trend cycle total trend cycle
YS measure 0.48 0.87 0.34 0.56 1.39 0.49
CP measure 0.33 0.39 0.28 0.55 1.64 0.53
state space system 0.35 0.27 0.38 0.49 0.86 0.48
The other rows in the table consider directly the change in volatility as one moves from statistical
to subjective premia. All numbers are ratios of standard deviations, subjective divided by statistical.
The columns labelled “total” report the volatility of a subjective premium as a fraction of the
volatility of the statistical premium for the diﬀerent measures. They range between 30 and 60
percent. Since the numerator is always the same, the volatility ratios are lower the better the
comparison statistical model predicts excess returns. The largest ratios arise for the YS measure
25which generates the least time variation in statistical premia. The columns labelled “trend” and
“cycle” report volatility ratios for the trend and cycle components across models. For the regression
based measures, the reduction in volatility is driven primarily by a reduction in the volatility of the
cyclical component. In fact, for the YS measure, the trend component is less volatile than that of
the subjective premium.
The row labelled “state space system” compares the subjective premium to the premium from
the estimated state space system. For the 10-year bond, this system is a better predictor of
expected excess returns than even the CP regression based measure. The reason is that the expected
inﬂation state variable helps forecast returns. For the system, the move to subjective premia
implies a substantial reduction in the volatility of the trend component. The system diﬀers from
the regression based measures in that it generates premia with somewhat larger trend components;
the shares of the trend components is 72% for the 2 year bond and 59% for the 10 year bond. These
components are due to the presence of expected inﬂa t i o ni nt h es y s t e m .
Figure 4 plots subjective premia on the two bonds together with the respective CP measures
as well as the statistical premia from the state space system. The properties from the table are
also visible to the naked eye. Consider ﬁrst the long, (10 year) bond in the bottom panel. Both
measures of statistical premia show substantial cyclical movements: most recessions during the
sample period can be identiﬁed as upward spikes in statistical premia, for example in 1970, 1991
and 2001. The CP measure also spikes in 1974 and 1979. Here the state-space system measure
responds less to the business cycle; this is because it is driven more by expected inﬂation which
lowers premia during this period. In contrast to both measures of statistical premia, the subjective
premium on the long bond responds only weakly to recessions. The bulk of the movement in the
subjective premium is at low frequencies: it was high in the late 1970s and early 1980s when the
level of the yield curve was high, and low towards the beginning and end of our sample.
Consider next the medium (2 year) bond. It is clear again that the subjective premium is
less volatile than the measures of statistical premia. At the same time, recession periods now
register as upward spikes in all of the displayed lines. The main diﬀerence between statistical and
s u b j e c t i v ep r e m i af o rt h em e d i u mb o n di si nt h et r e n d :t h es u b j e c t i v ep r e m i u mi sm u c hs m a l l e ri n
the late 1970s and early 1980s then the statistical premia. Comparing the statistical premia across



















One year premia, 10 year bond
Figure 4: Subjective premia compared with measures of objective premia. Premia are expected
excess holding period returns over one year, for a 2 year bond (top panel) and a 10 year bond
(bottom panel). In both panels, black lines are estimated subjective premia, light gray lines are
ﬁtted values from CP regression, dark gray lines are objective premia from state space system.
maturities (across panels), it is also apparent that statistical premia on the long bond are more
cyclical and exhibit less trend than statistical premia on the medium bond. For subjective premia,
the situation is the reverse.
The intuition for these results comes from the diﬀerences between survey forecasts and forecasts
derived from a statistical model. Under a statistical model, both the slope and the level are
indicators of high expected excess returns. For example, Figure 4 shows that measures of statistical
premia comove positively with both slope and level. We have seen in the previous section that survey
27forecasters treat both the level and the slope of the yield curve as more persistent than what they
are under a statistical model. This diﬀerence between survey forecasts and forecasts derived from
a statistical model of future bond prices then weakens the eﬀe c to fb o t hi n d i c a t o r s .
If the level of the yield curve is high, survey forecasters, who view the level as more persistent
than does an statistical model, expect higher interest rates, and hence lower prices, than the
statistical model. Lower expected prices means lower expected excess returns. Similarly, if the
slope is high, survey forecasters, who view the slope as more persistent, expect higher spreads, and
hence higher long interest rates, and lower long bond prices, than the statistical model. Again,
lower expected prices means lower expected excess returns. Both situations (high level, high spread)
which lead statistical models to indicate high expected excess returns thus induce survey forecasters
to predict lower prices and returns than the statistical models. This generates the overall reduction
in volatility.
The higher persistence of level and slope perceived by survey forecasters also helps explain the
diﬀerent frequency properties of premia on medium (for example 2 year) and long (for example 10
year) bonds. The level of the yield curve is always relatively more important for short bonds rather
than for long bonds. This is true not only for yields themselves, but also for measures of statistical
premia: those measures are driven relatively more by the slope for long bonds and relatively more
by the level for medium bonds. A move to subjective premia weakens the eﬀect of both indicators
of high premia, the slope and the level. For a given maturity, it tends to weaken more the eﬀect
of the indicator that is more important. The move thus makes the premium on long bonds less
responsive to the slope and it makes the premium on medium bonds less responsive to the level.
This is the eﬀect displayed in the ﬁgure.
III Structural Model
In this section, we consider a representative agent asset pricing model with an investor who learns
adaptively about consumption, inﬂation and bond prices. The learning algorithm, described in
detail below, gives rise to a sequence of probabilities  that describe investors’ subjective beliefs
about future consumption, inﬂation and bond prices conditional on the information at date .A t
28every date , agents plan ahead using the probability  for that date, and their Euler equations
hold under that belief.
A Preferences & Euler equations
Preferences over consumption streams  = {}
∞
=1 are represented by a version of the recursive
utility model (Epstein and Zin, 1989). The utility process  associated with the consumption
stream  solves







where  ∈ (01) and 0. Riskless consumption streams are ranked according to a separable log
utility criterion with discount factor . For an uncertain stream, current utility depends on the
certainty equivalent of future continuation utility. The certainty equivalent function takes a power
form with coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion . A separable (log) expected utility criterion arises
as the special case  =1 . More generally, Epstein-Zin preferences diﬀer from separable expected
utility because they do not impose indiﬀerence to the temporal distribution of risk.4
We assume that all shocks are homoskedastic and lognormal. This allows us to derive a linear
recursion for utility as in Hansen, Heaton, and Li (2008). Using lognormality to evaluate the
conditional expectation in (13), and writing lower case letters for logarithms, we have




With homoskedastic shocks, this recursion is a linear diﬀerence equation in  −  that can be
solved forward. We can then express the log ratio of continuation utility to consumption as an
4Consider two random consumption streams  = {}=1 and ˜  = {˜ }=1 such that the distribution of the date 
ﬂows  and ˜  i st h es a m ef o re v e r y (given information at date 0). Separable expected utility implies indiﬀerence
between  and ˜ , regardless of the correlation of consumption ﬂows across time periods. For example, suppose the
ﬂows  are perfectly correlated, whereas the ˜  are serially independent. Epstein-Zin utility allows a strict preference
for ˜ , but time separable expected utility does not.
29inﬁn i t es u mo fe x p e c t e dd i s c o u n t e df u t u r ec o n s u m p t i o ng r o w t h ,




Let +1 denote the nominal return on some asset between dates  and +1,a n dl e t denote




















If  =1 , this is the standard Euler equation for a log utility investor. More generally, the marginal
rate of substitution between wealth at  and  +1depends on the surprise in continuation utility.
The term multiplying the return under the expectation is the nominal pricing kernel.
To evaluate Euler equations for nominal bonds, it is convenient to write them in logs. We ﬁrst
deﬁne the log nominal pricing kernel
+1 := l o g  − ∆+1 − +1





The nominal pricing kernel is high in “bad” states of the world, where the investor has a high need
for nominal payoﬀ. Under log utility ( =1 ), these are states where nominal consumption is low.
If 1 a state can also be bad just because the outlook on the future, captured by continuation
utility, has become surprisingly low.
The Euler equation (16) holds in particular for a zero coupon bond of maturity 1 that has log
return 
(1)
 .T h e1-period interest rate thus satisﬁes

(1)




= −log + [∆+1 + +1] −
1
2









30As in the standard log utility model, the short rate moves with expected nominal consumption
growth. More generally, Epstein-Zin utility modiﬁes the precautionary savings motive. With log
utility, the nominal interest rate is smaller the larger is the volatility of nominal consumption
growth. If 1, investors particularly dislike persistent consumption risk. As a result, the
nominal rate is lower the more nominal growth covaries with expected future growth.























The left hand side is the (log) risk premium on an - p e r i o db o n dh e l do v e ro n ep e r i o d .I tc o n s i s t s
of the log expected excess return — the log expected capital gain less the log one period rate— plus
a Jensen’s inequality term. Here we follow convention and include the Jensen’s inequality term in
the risk premium.
The right hand side of (19) is the covariance between the nominal pricing kernel and the uncer-
tain payoﬀ on the long ( period) bond. If the long bond pays oﬀ more in bad states — when +1
is high — then it provides insurance against bad states, and should earn a return that is lower than
the short (one period) rate. In other words, it should earn a negative risk premium. In contrast, if
the long bond pays more in good states, when +1 is low, then it pays oﬀ exactly at the wrong
time, and investors must be compensated in order to hold it. This compensation is provided by a
positive risk premium.
To see how diﬀerent shocks aﬀect the risk premium, we use (15) to write




where  is predetermined as of date . Viewed from the perspective of date , movements in +1
can be due to innovations to nominal consumption growth (as in the standard log case), but also
to “news” about future consumption growth. Positive bond risk premia could thus arise either
31because bond prices are high when nominal growth is high, or, with 1, because nominal bond
prices are high when bad news about future consumption growth arrives. Time variation in bond
risk premia (under the belief of the agent) requires changes in the covariance between bond prices
and either nominal growth or news about growth.5
B Comparing model and data
In the previous subsection, we have used only the implication of the Euler equation for returns
between dates  and +1. More generally, there are Euler equations corresponding to interest rates
and excess returns over many diﬀerent horizons. In order to quantitatively evaluate our model, we
consider two sets of conditions. First, we consider the Euler equation for horizon  and a -period





















This type of condition thus connects interest rates of any horizon to conditional moments of the
pricing kernel.
The second type of condition come from the Euler equation for horizon  and a bond of maturity
 . The risk premium earned for holding an - p e r i o db o n do v e r periods is denoted 
()
+











































In this form, the condition relates the forward rate to conditional moments of the pricing kernel as
well as of bond payoﬀs at date  + .
5The importance of news shocks for risk premia when agents have Epstein-Zin utility is directly related to agents’
concern with the temporal distribution of risk. If 1, agents dislike persistence in consumption streams and fear
downward revisions in consumption expectations.
32We want to use the family of conditional Euler equations (20)-(21) to compare the quantitative
implications of the model to data. One diﬃculty we face is that the moments (20)-(21) must be
computed under the agent’s subjective belief. The subjective belief will generally diﬀer from the
empirical distribution of the data. As a result, standard instrumental variables techniques for the
evaluation of conditional Euler equations do not apply. Instead, we directly evaluate the Euler
equations date by date by computing the conditional moments in (20)-(21) under the subjective
belief implied by the agent’s learning algorithm. We can then check the resulting sequences of Euler
equation errors.
Explaining statistical risk premia
We also want to study standard measures of risk premia derived from statistical models. Let
b 
()
+ denote the risk premium implied by a statistical model, for example the model estimated in
section II.B. It is deﬁned in the same way as the subjective risk premium above, except that the
conditional moments are evaluated under the statistical model, rather than the investor’s subjective
belief. We can decompose this statistical premium in a way that is analogous to the decomposition




















The results of section II.B suggest that both terms of the decomposition move around and
contribute to predictability, with the forecast diﬀerence being more important at business cycle
frequencies, and the subjective premium being more important at lower frequencies. We want to
ﬁnd out whether learning can explain this ﬁnding. To this end, we compute both terms in equation
(22) — the diﬀerence in risk premia and the subjective premium — under the belief of a learning
agent. We compare both terms to their counterparts observed in data. The observed diﬀerence in
risk premia is the diﬀerence between statistical premium and the premium computed using surveys.
The observed subjective premium is the subjective premium computed from surveys in section II.B.
33C Learning algorithm
Most asset pricing studies assume that investor beliefs are conditionals of a stationary stochastic
process that is estimated using all data through the date when the study is undertaken. This
approach has two unattractive properties. First, it ignores the fact that investors in, say, 1980 only
had access to data up to 1980. Second, it assumes that agents believed in the same stationary
model throughout the postwar period. This is problematic given that the 1970s are often viewed
as a period of structural change. Indeed, the decade witnessed the ﬁrst ever peacetime inﬂation in
the US, the breakdown of leading macroeconomic models, as well as signiﬁcant innovation in bond
markets.
We construct a sequence of beliefs for investors who learn from real time data and are concerned
with structural change. We assume that at every date , investors form beliefs based on a state
space system of the form (5)-(8). The system includes prices, because we want to evaluate the
price moments in conditional Euler equations of the type (21). We reestimate the system for every
date  u s i n go n l yd a t au pt od a t e. To accommodate concern with structural change, we maximize
am o d i ﬁed likelihood function that puts more weight on more recent observations. To allow a
suﬃciently large initial sample for the estimation, and because we want to compare the results to
our survey forecast data, the ﬁrst belief is constructed for 1970:1. The analysis in this section will











. The system to be estimated can be written in compact
notation as
 =  + −1 + 
 = −1 + 

()
 =  + >
 ; 16=2 0  (23)
We impose the same parameter restrictions on  , , Ω and ( ) as in section II.
The estimation for every date  follows the same two steps as the estimation of the reduced form
model in section II. In step 1, we estimate the dynamics of the factors together with the vector
34,t h a ti s ,t h eﬁrst two equation of (23). Let  ∈ (01) denote a “forget factor” that deﬁnes a
sequence of geometrically declining sample weights. The weighted sample mean for date  is








The sequence of estimated means picks up a low frequency component in . We estimate (23)








logdet(Ω)+( − − b  () − −1−)
> Ω−1 (− − b  () − −1−)
i
starting at 0 =0  The special case  =1corresponds to standard maximum likelihood estimation:
it minimizes the equally weighted sum of squared in-sample forecast errors. In contrast, the crite-
rion (25) penalizes recent forecast errors more heavily than those in the distant past. Ljung and
Soderstrom (1987) and Sargent (1993) advocate this approach to adaptive learning in situations
where the dynamics of a process may change over time. As in Section II, the estimation step not
only delivers estimates for the matrices   and Ω, but also estimates for the sequence of
states ()

=1,s t a r t i n gf r o m0 =0 . In particular, we obtain an estimate of the current state 
that can be taken as the basis for forecasting future fundamentals under the system estimated with
data up to date .





rate coeﬃcients ( ) in the third equation of (23). As in section II, this step minimizes the sum
of squared diﬀerences between interest rates in the data and interest rates predicted by the model.
In this step we also weight the squared errors in the same way as the forecast errors in (25).
A byproduct of the date  estimation is an estimate of the date  factors as perceived by the
agent at date . Computing conditional distributions given  date by date produces a sequence of
investor beliefs. The subjective belief at date  determines investors’ evaluation of future utility and
asset payoﬀs at date . We thus use this belief below to calculate expectations of the pricing kernel,
that is, yields, for date . In contrast to the benchmark approach, the exercise of this section does
not impose any direct restriction on beliefs across diﬀerent dates; for example, it does not require
35that all beliefs are conditionals of the same probability over sequences of data. The updating of
beliefs is thus implicit in the sequential estimation.
The model also does not impose a direct link between investor beliefs and some “true data
generating process,” as the benchmark approach does by imposing rational expectations. The belief
at date  captures investors’ subjective distribution over fundamentals at date .I ti sc o n s t r a i n e d
only by past observations (via the estimation step), and not by our (the modelers’) knowledge of
what happened later.
D Subjective forecasts
The learning algorithm performs two jobs in our model. First, it delivers samples of subjective
forecasts that can be compared to survey forecasts. Second, it generates the complete conditional
distribution of interest rates and the pricing kernel. In particular, the recursive estimation will
generally lead to changes in conditional second moments, and hence to changes in subjective risk
premia. The two jobs performed by the learning algorithm correspond closely to the two terms
in the decomposition of statistical risk premia (22). In this subsection, we consider subjective
forecasts.
Summary statistics
Table 6 shows summary statistics on subjective forecasts by adaptive learners. Its basic structure
is similar to Table 3: for every variable (inﬂation and yields of diﬀerent maturities) and every
forecast horizon for which we have data, we compare mean absolute diﬀerences between subjective
forecasts and actual survey forecasts. We report two models where more recent data are weighted
more heavily, with forget factors  = 9 and  = 95 For comparison, we also report recursive
maximum likelihood estimation ( =1 ), which weighs all data up to  e q u a l l y ,a sw e l la st h e
forecast from the baseline statistical model of section II.B.
The main result from the table is that forecasts made by adaptive learners are closer to survey
forecasts than forecasts from a statistical model. For essentially all interest rates as well as for
inﬂation, the mean absolute diﬀerence between the learning forecast and the survey forecast is
s m a l l e rt h a nt h ed i ﬀerence between the statistical forecast and the survey forecast. The only
36exception comes for short (2 quarter) horizon forecasts of medium term (e.g., 20 year) bonds.
Overall, survey forecasters thus seem to behave more like adaptive learners than like agents who
have been given the statistical model that we have today.
Diﬀerences in risk premia
We now turn to the role of adaptive learning for statistical risk premia. We know from Figure
1 that there are systematic diﬀerences between statistical and survey forecasts that account for a
signiﬁcant part of statistical risk premia. The question here is whether learning forecasts share
this property of survey forecasts. In other words, can adaptive learning be the reason why survey
forecasters diﬀer systematically from statistical forecasts, and in a way that helps understand
statistical risk premia?
We consider the risk premium for holding a 10-year bond over 1 year, and ﬁx the forget factor
to  = 95 Unfortunately, we do not have actual survey data for a forecast horizon of one year
over the whole sample. We thus use forecasts computed from the subjective state space system
in section II.B as a proxy. As we have seen, those forecasts provide a good approximation to the
actual survey forecasts.
Figure 5 plots the diﬀerence in risk premia — statistical premium minus subjective premium —
for the 10 year bond held over one year. For the gray line, the subjective premium is from surveys,
whereas for the black it comes from the learning model. The two lines share two properties. First,
both are negative most of the time before 1980, and positive thereafter. In times of increasing
inﬂation and interest rates before 1980, statistical forecasts of interest rates were typically higher
than survey forecasts, which were “lagging behind” the increase in rates. As a result, survey
forecasters predicted higher bond prices and hence premia. In contrast, in times of decreasing
inﬂation and interest rates after 1980, statistical forecasts of interest rates were typically lower than
survey forecasts — the survey forecasters, again “lagging behind” were still predicting higher rates.
As a result, survey forecasters were also predicting lower bond prices and premia. The adaptive
nature of the learning algorithm captures this basic pattern of forecasters “lagging behind.”
37Table 6: Forecasts from Learning Algorithm
Panel A: Mean absolute ﬁtting errors for Bluechip yield forecasts
(annualized basis points)
horizon 2 quarters 4 quarters
maturity (qtrs) 1 4 20 40 120 1 4 20 40 120
learning  = 9 36 47 35 42 46 54 59 47 52 50
learning  = 95 30 47 33 44 58 49 56 51 62 69
rec. MLE ( =1 ) 51 54 33 44 72 72 72 64 77 103
stat. model 46 49 32 36 57 67 65 57 65 83
Panel B: Mean absolute ﬁtting errors for other forecasts
(annualized basic points)
survey SPF Goldsmith-Nagan
variable inﬂation 4 qtr yield 80 qtr yield
horizon 4 quarters 2 quarters
learning  = 9 74 196 38
 = 95 85 202 57
 =1 95 204 71
stat. model 99 211 61
The second property of both lines is that they tend to rise after recessions. This property
is more pronounced for the surveys; in particular, the learning model “misses” increases in the
premia diﬀerence after the 1990 recession, and also does not replicate all the increases after the
1970s recessions. Nevertheless, there is a clear cyclical pattern in the premia diﬀerences also for
the learning model.















Figure 5: Diﬀerences in risk premia
ER i s k p r e m i a
In this subsection, we evaluate conditional Euler equations. We focus on three equations. First,
we consider the interest rate equation (20) for horizons (and maturities)  =4quarters and  =
40 quarters. The Euler equation error in these interest rate equations tells us how well the model
describes the dynamics of the 1 year and 10 year yields to maturity. Second, we consider a forward
rate equation of the type (21) for  =4 0quarters and  =4quarters. The Euler equation error for
this equation tells us how well the model captures the risk premium on a 10 year bond held over 1
year.
39We ﬁx the forget parameter  = 95 and derive the associated sequence of agent beliefs. We
then select the preference parameters  and  in order to minimize the equally weighted squared
sum of the Euler equation errors on the three conditional Euler equations. To provide context, we
perform this exercise not only for our learning agent with Epstein-Zin utility, but for two agents
with beliefs given by the benchmark statistical model: an agent with log utility and one with
Epstein-Zin utility. Table 7 reports, for every model, the preference parameters that minimize the
Euler equation errors, as well as the mean absolute Euler equation errors for each of the three
equations. Here we have labelled the three equations by the interest rate or forward rate appearing
on the left hand side of (20) or (21), respectively.
The properties of the benchmark log utility case are well known. With log utility and ho-
moskedastic shocks — as under the statistical belief — interest rates are, up to constant, equal to
expected nominal consumption growth. As a result, the log utility model has problems generating
suﬃcient volatility in yields. Moreover, the model cannot generate an upward sloping average yield
curve.6 Intuitively, in a log model, long bonds are less risky since they provide insurance against
times of low consumption growth.
Retaining the statistical belief, but moving to Epstein-Zin utility does not change the Euler
equation errors much, even though risk aversion increases now to 26. The new feature with Epstein-
Zin utility is that covariance with expected future growth now matters for yield spreads and risk
premia. On the one hand, the yield curve slopes upwards if inﬂation delivers bad news about future
consumption growth, as in Piazzesi and Schneider (2007). On the other hand, Euler equations for
bond risk premia implies a positive bond risk premium if a high bond price is good news for future
consumption growth. Under the statistical belief, the former eﬀect is present for high enough 
However, the second eﬀect is not present under the statistical belief. This leads our ﬁtting procedure
to select low risk aversion, and a small improvement in ﬁt relative to the log case.
Under learning, the errors on all Euler equations are signiﬁcantly smaller than under the statis-
tical belief. Risk aversion is now 80. The reason for this result is that, over much of the sample, the
distributions estimated by the learning algorithm have both high inﬂation predict low consumption
6Mechanically, an upward sloping yield curve requires that the term in brackets on the right hand side of 20 grow
faster than linearly with maturity . Since nominal growth is persistent, this cannot be true with log utility.
40growth, and high interest rates predict low growth. The ﬁrst eﬀect contributes to an upward sloping
yield curve, whereas the second eﬀect helps generate positive bond premia.
Table 7 does not directly show how the statistical belief and learning model diﬀer in terms
of time variation in risk premia. Since our statistical system is homoskedastic, the model under
the statistical belief does not give rise to any time variation in statistical premia. In contrast, the
learning model leads to time variation, both because of forecast diﬀerences, as discussed in the
previous subsection, and because of changes in risk brought about by the learning process. We now
describe this time variation.
Table 7: Euler Equations Errors
model Preferences Euler equation errors









log utility .9970 1 1.97 1.70 0.83
Epstein-Zin .9961 26 1.96 1.69 0.86
learning  = 95
Epstein-Zin .9966 80 1.76 1.21 0.62
T i m ev a r i a t i o ni nr i s kp r e m i a
Figure 6 plots subjective and statistical risk premia for the 10 year bond held over 1 year
under the learning model, together with the data counterparts (derived from surveys). The top
panel contains subjective premia, that is, the covariance between the pricing kernel and the bond
payoﬀ. As discussed in section II.B, the subjective premium implied by survey forecasts exhibits
a large low frequency component that is particularly high around 1980. The ﬁgure shows that the
subjective premium under learning also exhibits a low frequency component that is high around
1980. This movement is due to slow changes in the covariance between bond payoﬀs and expected
future consumption growth.
The bottom panel of Figure 6 adds together the two components of the statistical risk premium
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Figure 6: Time variation in risk premia
(22) under the learning model, and compares the sum to the statistical risk premium from the
data. Both the forecast diﬀerence from Figure 5 and the subjective premium from the top panel of
Figure 6 contribute to generate time variation in statistical premia under the learning model.
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44A Appendix
A.1 Estimation procedure for state space system
We use a two-step procedure to estimate the dynamics of consumption growth, inﬂation, and interest
rates. The parameters  can be partitioned into the parameters of the state space (Ω )
and market prices of risk (0 1) In the ﬁrst step, we estimate the state-space parameters with
maximum likelihood. In the second step, we estimate the parameters 0 and 1 given the parameters
Ω ,a n d estimated in the ﬁrst step. This is done by minimizing the sum of squared
ﬁtting errors of the model. More precisely, we compute yields according to the formulab  = +>















for the  yields in our database.
We compute standard errors for our parameter estimates using GMM, with moments from both
stages of our estimation procedure. The MLE moments are the scores of the likelihood function for
1 =( Ω ), and the NLS moments are the ﬁrst-order conditions of the minimization
(A-1) for 2 =( 0 1). The standard errors we compute adjust for the two-state nature of the
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where b 1 is ﬁxed at the solution of the minimization problem (A-1). We deﬁne  = >
 
To obtain GMM standard errors, we expand the function 1 and 2 around the true parameter
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⎠ is the variance of the sample mean of the moment conditions. The
upper-left matrix 11 is the simply the information matrix.
46A.2 Estimation procedure for the subjective state space system
The subjective state space system can be derived from the objective state space system using the
parameters (0 1) Therefore, we estimate the subjective state space system in three steps. The
ﬁrst two steps are as before; in the ﬁrst step, we obtain the state space parameters (Ω )
with MLE, and in the second step, we obtain market prices of risk (0 1) using NLS. In the third
step, we estimate parameters (0 1) by minimizing the squared diﬀerences between survey forecasts
and subjective forecasts. More precisely, we compute forecasts ∗
 + = ∗
 +∗ and use survey
data to form:
min
{01}

=1

=1
³
b 
()
 − 
()

´2

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